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The new Act on the National Bank of Hungary, enacted by Parliament
and effective as of 13 July 2001, defines the primary objective of the
Bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Using an
inflation targeting system, the Bank seeks to attain a 2% rate of infla-
tion, corresponding in effect to price stability, by implementing a grad-
ual, but firm disinflation programme over the course of several years.
In order to provide the public with a clear insight into the operation
of central bank policies and enhance transparency, the Bank publishes
the “Quarterly Report on Inflation”, covering recent and prospective de-
velopments in inflation and evaluating the macroeconomic develop-
ments determining inflation. This publication summarises the projec-
tions and considerations that underlie the decisions of the Monetary
Council.
The Monetary Council, the supreme decision making body of the Na-
tional Bank of Hungary, will carry out a comprehensive review of the
expected development of inflation once every three months, in order to
establish the monetary conditions that are consistent with achieving the
inflation target. The first section of the publication presents the Mone-
tary Council’s position and the grounds for its decisions. This is followed
by a projection prepared by the analysts at the Bank’s Economics
Department on the outlook for inflation and the underlying principal
macroeconomic developments. This projection serves as background
information for Monetary Council members.
Since the Monetary Council was only established subsequent to the com-
pletion of this Report, the first projections presented herein for the vari-
ables that can be regarded as exogenous to monetary policy are either
determined on the basis of market expectations or use the data for the
last complete month, assuming that these remain unchanged during
the forecast period. In the future, the assumptions underlying the pro-
jections will reflect the stance of the Monetary Council.
  
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Boxes and Annexes in the Quarterly Report on Inflation

At its session on 23 July 2001, the Monetary Council reviewed the report on the stateof the economy and the expected developments with regard to growth and inflation. After
the discussion of the report, the Monetary Council took the position that there was currently
no need to change the monetary conditions. On the basis of the currently expected external
and internal economic conditions, an exchange rate in the current range of 245–250 forints to
the euro will help inflation stay within the projected 7 ± 1% band at the end of 2001 and meet
the 4.5 ± 1% inflation target by the end of 2002. This inflation projection is based on the assump-
tion that the world price for oil and the euro/dollar exchange rate will not change significantly
relative to their average values in June, and cyclical conditions will also be in line with projec-
tions.
The past two months have witnessed significant tightening in monetary conditions. Based
on the joint decision of the Central Bank Council and the Government, the Bank widened the in-
tervention band of the forint's exchange rate to ±15% as of 3 May 2001, while retaining the 0.2%
monthly rate of devaluing the forint's central parity. Since the change in the exchange rate sys-
tem, the central bank has not made any interest rates changes, but the widening of the band has
been followed by an appreciation of the forint. The key factor behind the appreciation has been
higher external demand for longer term government securities. As a complementary measure to
the band-widening, a government decree, effective as of June 18, removed, all remaining restric-
tions in the way of the forint's full convertibility. In spite of this foreign currency liberalisation,
there have been no significant speculative short-term interest rate sensitive capital inflows.
The transformation of the monetary regime was necessitated by the persistently high rate
of inflation. This unfavourable development could be primarily attributed to a series of negative
external shocks occurring over the past one and a half years. In addition to these shocks, the neg-
ative effects of inflation expectations have also become a contributing factor from the second half
of 2000.
In the opinion of the Monetary Council, it is not the overheating of the economy that is to
blame for the worse-than-projected outcome of inflation: the unfavourable turn in the external
cyclical conditions is expected to cause a slowdown in this year's aggregate demand growth
compared to 2000. Consequently, the National Bank seeks to moderate inflation expectations so
that the slowing of inflation can take place at the smallest possible cost to economic growth.
Under the regime of inflation targeting, the National Bank will give guidance to economic agents
by projecting a disinflation path over a horizon of several years. If prices and wages rise in accor-
dance with the projected path, it will be possible to curtail the economic costs of disinflation.
The National Bank expects that the private sector will exhibit greater flexibility than this year in
adjusting wage increases.
Based on its forecasts, the Bank expects GDP to grow in a balanced manner at a rate in the
range of 4–5% in both 2001 and 2002. The slowdown in the economic growth of Hungary's main
international trading partners in 2001 will be offset by expansionary fiscal policy. Of the domestic
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Evaluation of monetary policy
components of demand, consumer
spending is expected to grow by
4.5%, thanks to a rapid rise in
household incomes.
In 2002, the forces driving
growth are expected to change.
In line with international forecasts,
the National Bank also expects
a pick-up in external economic
growth. Public sector demand will
no longer rise compared with
2001; fiscal policy will not signifi-
cantly increase aggregate demand
according to the Monetary Coun-
cil's expectations.
As a result of domestic absorp-
tion outstripping GDP growth in
both years, the external financing
requirement will increase. The cur-
rent account deficit is expected to
amount to about 4% of GDP in 2001
and slightly above it in 2002. Based
on projections regarding financing,
these deficits are consistent with the Bank's exchange rate objectives.
Forecasting the path of inflation over the short term is a difficult task since during the current
period of transition the National Bank has not yet gained sufficient experience about how long
economic agents' adjustment to the new regime will take. Therefore, when making its projec-
tions, the National Bank has also relied on the experience of European small open economies
with exchange rate regimes similar to that of Hungary in order to make up for missing informa-
tion. The Monetary Council expects that economic agents will pay increasing attention to the
new exchange rate and inflation path when setting their prices.
The Monetary Council's expectation is that the external inflationary pressures that prevailed
over the past two years will gradually disappear. This assumes, inter alia, that unprocessed food-
stuff prices will increase at a considerably slower pace.
With unchanged monetary policy and assuming that the external and domestic develop-
ments are in line with the above projections, the National Bank projects the rate of consumer
price inflation to be in the range of 7–8% in December 2001, i.e. the upper range of the Bank's
inflation target band. In comparison, the inflation rate for December 2002 is more likely to fall in
the lower range of the target band. The degree of uncertainty about the inflation outcome is sig-
nificant in both years. In 2001, the risks have an asymmetrical distribution, being more on the up-
side. This is due to the uncertainty about the development of unprocessed foodstuff prices. The
uncertainty about the inflation outcome in 2002 can be viewed as symmetrical.
MONETARY COUNCIL
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Chart 1 Inflation projection
Percentage changes on a year earlier
Note: The fan chart shows the probability distribution of the outcomes around the central projection.
The central band with the darkest shade includes the central projection. The entire shaded area cov-
ers 90% of all probabilities, with a 5% likelihood that the inflation outcome will fall outside the upper-
most shaded band. Outside the central projection, the bands represent a 15% probability each. The
uncertainty intervals have been estimated on the basis of the Bank’s past forecasting experience er-
rors, taking into account the uncertainties about the current projections. The two white dots represent
the inflation targets (7% and 4.5%); the straight lines mark the ±1% tolerance band on either side of the
target rates..
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In the first half of 2001, the consumer price index (CPI) of 10.4%exceeded the average rate for the past two years. The factor be-
hind this negative development was inflation inertia emerging in
the aftermath of last year’s temporary inflationary shocks, aggra-
vated by yet another rise in unprocessed foodstuff prices in the
second quarter.
In terms of consumer basket components, tradable goods and
market services prices play a crucial role from the point of view of
monetary policy. The former provides information as to the effi-
ciency of the transmission mechanism of exchange rate policy, i.e.
the operation of the exchange rate channel. The latter reflects the
credibility and sustainability of exchange rate-based disinflation.
Inflation in tradable goods, accounting for roughly one-
quarter of the consumer basket, is determined by the imported
inflation rate and the exchange rate path. During the first six
months, inflation rates of over 5% exceeded the rate at which the
forint depreciated in 12 month. Yet this difference between the
rates of price increases and devaluation can be satisfactorily ex-
plained by the acceleration in tradable goods price inflation im-
ported from Europe (see Chart I-1).
The direct effect of past supply shocks and the indirect effect
of the inflation inertia triggered by such have been most apparent
in market services price inflation. Unlike tradable goods prices,
those of market services are not disciplined by import competi-
tion. They are primarily governed by cost-side inflation develop-
ments, domestic demand and domestic price setters’ inflation ex-
pectations. The first was undoubtedly a contributing factor to the
rise in the services price index, with the jump in energy and fuel
prices, and in meat prices last summer, not taking long to feed
through to services prices. However, the direct inflationary pres-
sures arising from last year’s developments have tapered off this
year, and domestic demand growth has also moderated. There-
fore, the Bank attributes the acceleration in the price index to ser-
vices sector price setters’ higher inflation expectations. In 2001
Q2, the adverse trend in the price index of services seemed to
have reversed, beginning to decline again in this quarter (see
Chart I-2).
In 2001 Q2, the jump in the price of pork directly raised head-
line CPI inflation by 0.8 percentage points. According to the
Bank’s estimates, within the course of one year, unprocessed
foodstuff price inflation may feed through to about one-fifth of
the goods in the consumer basket. This will first push up pro-
cessed foodstuff prices and subsequently prices of certain ser-
vices that are sensitive to food prices. Last summer’s meat price
shock, together with the cereal price increases in autumn 2000,
has kept the quarterly price index values high for nearly a year .
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Chart I-2 Market services price inflation
Percentage changes on a year earlier
Extreme fluctuations in the prices of domestic agricultural
products, which significantly exceed the rates seen in neighbour-
ing countries and the EU countries, represent additional serious
challenges to disinflation policy (see Chart I-3).
After declining at the end of last year, the price level of vehicle
fuels, regarded as a large CPI component, rose at a steady rate
throughout the first six months, approaching the peak rate mea-
sured before last year's decreases. In addition to flat oil prices
and a weak euro, this appeared to be the result of a one-off sup-
ply shock, exerting extra upward pressure on the regional price
level of petrol. Available data show that the domestic price level
of petrol has started to decrease since May, due party to the
strengthening of the forint. This decline is expected to first ap-
pear in the July price index. Following an over 60% rise in 2000,
market-priced household energy (bottled gas, briquette, coal
and firewood) prices have been falling steadily over the past few
months.
On the whole, regulated prices followed our expected trend,
rising by 7.8% during the first six months, not as fast as the CPI,
which thus exerted downward pressure on inflation during the
first half of the year.
Prices regulated by the central authorities increased by 6% in
general. This rate refers to electricity and, in rough terms, com-
munication and subsidised pharmaceuticals prices. The price for
natural gas rose by 12% in July, but the impact of this increase will
first appear in August.
The prices of services provided by local government authori-
ties increased faster than the targeted 6% rate. Prices for housing
services went up by 10% during the first half of the year. District
heating prices will begin increasing from the start of the heating
season in autumn.
The 6% average valorisation of excise duties took place early
in the year. This comprised a 15% rise in the tax on tobacco,
aimed to approximate tax content norms within the EU. By con-
trast, the excise tax on vehicle fuel remained unchanged. The
rate of excise duties had a 0.3 percentage point impact on head-
line CPI.
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energy price levels
1 Central bank interest rates
and short-term market yields
The National Bank has not changed its key rates over the pastfour months. While the level of interest rates remained un-
changed, monetary conditions tightened significantly, as the
widening of the band was followed by a 5–10% appreciation
of the forint’s exchange rate. Under the narrow-band regime pre-
ceding the band-widening, the so-called interest premium, de-
rived as the difference between three-month forint and foreign
(euro) yields and the rate of devaluation announced for the sub-
sequent three months, provided a good approximation of ex-
pected excess returns on short-term forint investments. This was
because, apart from periods of capital market crises, intra-band
exchange rate movements were minimal: the exchange rate,
which stayed near the strong edge of the intervention band, was
expected to depreciate over the short term at virtually the same
rate as the official rate of devaluation.
With the widening of the band in May, the earlier method of
calculating the interest premium is no longer suitable, since the
official rate of devaluation and the exchange rate expectations
are no longer as closely linked as under the narrow-band system.
Therefore, following the change of the regime, the Bank is focus-
sing on the (actual and expected) three-month interest rate dif-
ferential vis-à-vis the euro area (see Chart II-1).
The difference between three-month forint and euro yields
has fluctuated in the range of 630 and 670 basis points over the
past four months. (see Chart II–2). Short-term forint rates re-
mained relatively stable in this period. The fluctuation of the in-
terest rate differential was more of a result of swings in short-term
euro yields as expectations of an ECB rate cut were continuously
changing.
Forward yields derived from the yield curve and the Reuters
poll provide indications of market participants’ expectations re-
garding the future course of the central bank interest rate. The ex-
pectations for the central bank rate at end-2001 remained virtu-
ally unchanged during the period from March to early July, at
around 10%. Thus, neither the band-widening, nor the an-
nouncement of the inflation target have significantly altered ex-
pectations pertaining to this year’s interest rate policy. At the
same time, unchanged nominal rates reflect higher real interest
rate expectations, since the period since March has seen a de-
crease in macroanalysts’ inflation expectations for end-2001.The
investor confidence crisis about emerging markets first experi-
enced on July 6th and the weakening of the forint have changed
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Chart II-1 Central bank base rate and short-term
market yields
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Chart II-2 Three-month interest rate differential
vis-à-vis the euro area
interest rate expectations. There has been an upward shift in the
expected path of central bank rates: according to the two-week
interest rate path derived from the yield curve, at mid-July, mar-
ket participants did not expect a rate cut for the following month
(see Chart II-3).
2 Changes in risk perceptions
The perceived risk of forint investments, which is crucial to thedevelopment of capital flows and yields, is more markedly
reflected in exchange rate movements now that the band has
been widened. In addition to domestic economic fundamentals,
international money and capital markets’ “global appetite for
risk” frequently has a great influence on the perceived risk of
Hungarian investments.
Over the past few months, foreign investors’ willingness to
take risk has been influenced by swings in expectations about US
growth prospects and the Fed’s interest rate moves. A similar fac-
tor of uncertainty was associated with the cyclical position of the
euro area, where the adverse effect of slowing US growth and the
European Central Bank’s tight interest rate policy have both
dampened growth expectations. Furthermore, the general risk
perception of emerging countries has also had an impact on in-
vestors’ willingness to take on risk, especially in July.
Continuing the trend seen early in the year, the indicators of
the „appetite for risk” in developed countries continued to in-
crease in March, thanks primarily to deterioration in and higher
uncertainty about US economic prospects. However, the publi-
cation of more favourable data in April and another unexpected
rate cut by the Fed on April 18th gave rise to more optimism.
Since then, indicators of risk-taking willingness have steadily de-
clined. This first upward, then downward path of risk perception
has been reflected in the interest premium on Hungarian foreign
currency bonds as well as the inflow of portfolio capital, which
showed a modest pace in March, but strengthened in April.
The EMBI spread,1 reflecting the risk premia on dollar-
denominated emerging country sovereign bonds, moved in an
opposite direction to global risk indicators in April. However,
this was exclusively due to unfavourable news from Argentina
and the higher required risk premia on South American sover-
eign bonds. Other (European and Asian) components of the
EMBI indicate that investors only perceived a region-specific
threat (see Chart II-4).
During May and June, foreign investor behaviour on the Hun-
garian money and capital market was primarily influenced by
country-specific factors (such as the widening of the band, for-
eign currency liberalisation and the announcement of the new
exchange rate regime). Nevertheless, global investor sentiment
was also beneficial to capital inflows: there was improvement in
the risk perception of both emerging and developed markets
during this period.
However, the Hungarian foreign exchange market experi-
enced another episode of emerging market contagion in July.
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A fresh wave of simultaneous bad news from Turkey and Argen-
tina, suffering from economic and financial troubles for several
months, and the controversy surrounding fiscal policy in Poland
triggered a depreciation of a few percentage points in the forint’s
exchange rate from July 6th on. At the same time, there was no
significant increase in either the spread of Hungarian foreign cur-
rency bonds or in forint yields.
3 Capital flows
and the exchange rate
The narrow-band exchange rate regime, in place for the firstfour months of the year, was characterised by a strong de-
mand for forints. Demand was exceptionally high in February
and April. The main factors behind this were non-residents’ pur-
chases of long-term government securities and FDI inflows,
while companies’ foreign currency borrowing fell. April saw a
significant rise in non-residents’ demand for short-term govern-
ment securities. Thanks to the vigorous inflow of funds, until the
band was widened, the exchange rate of the forint lingered at the
upper range of the intervention band, prompting the central
bank to intervene on several occasions (see Chart II-5).
After the band was widened on May 4th, non-residents’ de-
mand for long-term government securities increased. The in-
crease in foreign demand was offset by a decrease in commercial
banks’ on-balance-sheet foreign currency open positions. Banks
were only willing to wind up open positions as the exchange rate
was steadily appreciating. The domestic currency strengthened
steadily from HUF 267 to the euro on May 3rd to HUF 240 on July
4th, against the background of a nearly twofold rise in spot ex-
change market turnover relative to that prior to the band-
widening.
Non-residents’ government security purchases amounted to
approximately HUF 100 billion in May. Growth was largely due
to purchases of medium-term (one- to four-year) government se-
curities. Since the risk premium on forint yields is not likely to
have decreased in the wake of the band-widening, and me-
dium-term euro yields rose during this period, the upturn in the
demand for government securities can mainly be ascribed to a
shift in exchange rate expectations. Movements in the stock of
government securities point to foreign investors’ expectations of
a strengthening of the forint over the medium term, while the un-
certainty about more immediate movements has caused them to
refrain from buying short-term paper.
In June, non-residents’ forint demand fell from HUF 141.2 bil-
lion in May to HUF 4.7 billion. However, from the second week of
June, commercial banks reopened their net on-balance-sheet
foreign currency positions, which was a contributory factor in
the June strengthening of the forint’s exchange rate.
The less favourable capital market situation in the aftermath of
the Argentinian crisis in July led to a marked weakening in the ex-
change rates of Central and East European national currencies,
with the zloty down by 12% and the forint by 7%. The initial major
shift in the exchange rates was followed by a correction in re-
spect of both currencies. The depreciation of the forint might
have been partly due to the closing of earlier positions estab-
lished in expectation of an appreciation and the insufficient
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returns.
depth of the domestic foreign exchange market. The weakening
of the exchange rate led to a minor withdrawal of funds in the lat-
ter part of the month, along with an apparently weaker demand
at government security auctions.
During the period between the widening of the band and the
emerging market shock, exchange rate expectations moved in in
line with spot exchange rates. According to the Reuters poll pub-
lished on July 19th, macroanalysts’ average forecast for the ex-
change rate is HUF 249.8 to the euro at end-August 2001, HUF
252 at end-December 2001 and HUF 249.4 in December 2002,
with the individual forecasts showing significant variance.
Apparently, the shock in emerging countries early in July also de-
creased analysts’ expectations of the forint’s future exchange rate
(see Chart II-6 on Page 15).
Exchange rate volatility increased sharply as a consequence of
the characteristics of the new regime and the uncertainties con-
comitant with the period of transition. In the period since the
band was widened, the forint appeared to be slightly more vola-
tile than the Czech crown and significantly less volatile than the
Polish zloty (see Chart II-7 on Page 15).
Despite the increased risk, the volume of trade reported by the
two foreign exchange futures markets failed to increase, and in-
deed there was even some evidence of a downward trend.
Banks’ foreign exchange derivative positions developed sym-
metrically to those of their on-balance-sheet exposures in order
to prevent their total FX positions from being short. It is not the
two Hungarian FX futures markets that banks have used to ac-
commodate their changing hedging requirement, since the vol-
ume of exchange-traded futures appeared to be much more sta-
ble than the banks’ total derivative transactions. Naturally, not
only banks can trade on the exchanges, yet non-bank partici-
pants seem to be less active in using the exchange-traded instru-
ments for risk management (see Table II-1 and Charts II-8 and
II-9).
Since the widening of the exchange rate band, the central
bank has not intervened in the foreign exchange markets. How-
ever, since25 June 2001, the central bank has been purchasing
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Table II-1 Components of foreign exchange market demand and supply
The + sign denotes forint demand and the – sign denotes negative forint supply
HUF billions
2001
January February March April May June
Central bank intervention* –4.1 –133.4 –40.4 –135.0 –28.0 0
Current account balance –62.8 –14.3 –12.9 –0.5 –34.5
Non-interest-rate-sensitive capital-flows 54.8 66.8 40.5 38.0 30.4
FDI inflow (private sector) 42.9 67.0 32.8 34.2 28.3
Equities 11.9 –0.2 7.7 3.8 2.1
Interest rate sensitive capital flows 20.9 51.4 –10.8 54.5 –8.1
Change in non-residents’ holding of government securities –9.2 69.8 29.4 66.2 99.7 29.9
Short-term 6.9 5.4 –14.4 28.5 –10.1 –7.2
Long-term –16.2 64.4 43.8 37.7 109.8 37.1
Non-residents’ forint deposits 2.1 2.6 –12.0 19.8 41.5 –25.2
Non-residents, total –7.1 72.4 17.4 86.0 141.2 4.7
Credit institutions (change in on-balance-sheet open position) 37.0 31.3 –3.0 15.2 –107.7 79.7
Corporate sector 3.9 –51.8 –31.0 –46.2 –37.8
1 Change in net internal foreign currency lending 9.4 –44.5 9.0 21.9 –9.1
2 Change in non-residents’ foreign currency lending –5.5 –7.3 –40.1 –68.1 –28.7
Household sector –12.9 –0.5 5.7 –0.6 –3.7
General government demand for foreign currency –2.1
Other –8.8 29.5 23.6 43.0 40.2
*The entry “Central bank intervention” does not include foreign exchange market purchases associated with the public sector’s foreign exchange debt by the National Bank, acting as an agent of general government.
These purchases, made in equal amounts on a daily basis since 25 June 2001, are presented with the entry on “General government demand for foreign currency”.
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Chart II-9 Commercial banks’ open FX positions
foreign currency on a daily basis on behalf of the government in
order to service the interest on the country’s sovereign FX debt.
The Bank will buy foreign currency amounting to EUR 366 mil-
lion for the year as a whole. In order to prevent market partici-
pants from incorrectly interpreting these transactions as central
bank signals as well as to minimise their effect on the exchange
rate, the National Bank will announce in advance both the total
required amount of foreign currency and the size of daily pur-
chases. Furthermore, the transactions will take place in equal in-
stalments and at the same time on each business day.
4 Long-term yields and inflation
expectations
The previous Report traced the developments on the govern-ment securities markets until end-February. Since then,
yields with maturities in excess of one year have fallen signifi-
cantly, with the largest downward shift (80–100 basis points) oc-
curring in the two-to-five-year section of the yield curve (see
Chart II-10). As a result of this fall and a slight rise in five to
ten-year euro yields, the forint-euro yield differential fell consid-
erably. The shift in the implied forward curve indicates that the
decrease in long-term forint yields was mainly due to changes in
expected short rates one to four years ahead (see Chart II-11).
Following their upward trend in January and February, yields
on medium-to-long-term government securities continued to in-
crease in March. At the beginning of April, in parallel with the
global capital market risk indicators, forint implied forwards de-
rived from the zero-coupon yield curve increased by 100–150 ba-
sis points relative to corresponding euro forwards (see Chart
II-12). In addition to a rise in the required interest premium, ad-
verse changes in CPI inflation2 were also likely to have contrib-
uted to the increase in yields. The yield differential (150–200 ba-
sis points) showed the most marked rise in the two-to-four-year
segment, implying that the series of negative shocks had become
incorporated in medium-to-long-term inflation expectations.
Since the beginning of April, apart from ten-year yields re-
maining flat, shifts in the yield curve have been governed by a de-
crease in the required risk premium.
The widening of the forint’s exchange rate band represented a
landmark event in the development of inflation expectations.
The market welcomed this change in monetary policy. Even
though the rate of inflation was worse than expected in May, ana-
lysts’ average inflation forecast for December 2002 decreased
slightly at the end of the month and by 0.7 percentage points in
terms of the survey following the June announcement of the in-
flation target. This brought the forecast rate down from 6.34%
prior to the band-widening to 5.51%, close to the upper edge of
the tolerance band around the inflation target. According to the
July 19th poll, carried out after the emerging market turmoil in
early in July, analysts’ expectations of the forint’s exchange rate
in the next one-and-a half years seem to have declined. Consis-
tently, there was also a slight upward shift – to 5.75 % – in the rate
of inflation expected for end-2002.
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2 Since last June, macroanalysts have underestimated inflation typically by
0.2–0.3% (see Chart II-13) in each month except December and April.
After the band-widening, yields on government securities fell
spectacularly. The widening of the band and the strengthening of
the forint exerted downward pressure on domestic investors’
medium-term inflation expectations, while increasing foreign in-
vestors’ medium-term expectations of forint appreciation. This
was most apparent over the one-to-three-year horizon, with im-
plied forward rate differentials falling by 100–120 basis points.
After the announcement of the inflation-targeting regime, yields
with one-to-two-year maturities continued to fall. In addition to
the effect of medium-term inflation and exchange rate expecta-
tions, international investors’ steadily increasing “appetite for
risk” is presumed to have contributed to the trend only to a
smaller extent.
All in all, the widening of the band, the new exchange rate re-
gime and the announcement of the central bank’s inflation tar-
geting policy have had a positive impact on inflation expecta-
tions, reflected in the decrease in medium-to-long term yields.
This led to a significant fall in the difference between forint and
euro yields, with the ten-year interest rate differential exceeding
the rate satisfying the Maastricht convergence criterion by merely
60-80 basis points. It is important to note that the drop in lon-
ger-term yields was mainly due to a decline in medium-term for-
ward rates (one to five years ahead), whereas forward rates for
terms over five years did not fall significantly. This implies that
the band-widening and the inflation targeting regime have
mainly reduced medium-term expectations, causing market par-
ticipants to expect a brisker pace of disinflation and interest rate
convergence. There has been no considerable change in six-to-
ten-year interest rate expectations, probably because the market
had already priced in EMU entry and nominal convergence with
on that horizon.
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This chapter analyses the factors bearing on the developmentof inflation in Hungary. In a small open economy, prices are
governed to a significant extent by external demand, the terms of
trade, foreign prices and change in nominal exchange rates, in
addition to domestic supply and demand. Firstly we deal with in-
ternal demand and external trade, secondly we analyse external
inflation trends. Supply-side developments are examined via the
labour market of the private sector.1
1 Demand
In 2001 Q1, GDP grew at an annual rate of 4.4%. The accelera-tion of household consumption expenditures was a major fac-
tor contributing to this growth. In contrast to expectations, the
volume of investment continued to rise at a moderate rate. Al-
though the first quarter saw significant growth in exports,
short-term trends point to a slowdown. Imports grew at a slower
pace than exports, due to subdued investment growth and
destocking, in addition to lower export expectations. During the
first half of the year, general government’s demand effect was
0.4% of GDP.
Over the forecast horizon, we do not expect a recurrence of
last year’s deterioration in the terms of trade. In 2000, the deterio-
ration in the terms of trade caused gross national disposable in-
come (GNDI) to grow at a slower pace than GDP, which was also
reflected in the trade balance. However, in 2001 and 2002, GNDI
is not expected to hamper domestic absorption or worsen the
trade balance in nominal terms (see Table III-1, III-2).
The National Bank forecasts that the economy will continue
growing at a robust rate in 2001 and 2002. This is based on the
projection that other effects, such as the fiscal demand shock this
year and a better external cyclical environment next year, will
offset the real impact of the forint’s appreciation. The Bank’s cen-
tral projection falls in the middle of the ranges given in Table
III-3, but in 2002, due to the appreciation of the forint, the out-
come for GDP growth is more likely to fall within the lower half
of the 4–4.9% range.
In 2001, both consumption and investment are projected to
contribute to growth at a stronger rate, while the contribution of
net exports becomes negative. In 2002, domestic absorption is
expected to play a lesser role, while net exports put less down-
ward pressure on economic growth than in the previous year. In
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Table III-1 Annual growth of GDP and its components
Percentage changes on a year earlier
Per cent
2000 2001
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Year Q1
Household final consumption
expenditure 3.7 3.8 3.7 4.0 3.8 5.4
Social transfers in kind 0.3 1.8 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.2
Household consumption 3.0 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.3 4.5
Public consumption 1.0 1.1 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.2
Gross fixed capital formation 7.7 6.2 2.9 9.1 6.6 5.3
Gross capital formation* 14.5 4.2 9.5 11.9 9.9 0.0
Domestic absorption, total 5.7 3.4 5.0 6.0 5.0 2.9
Exports 20.9 21.0 19.9 25.0 21.8 21.4
Imports 18.5 16.4 20.8 27.3 21.1 18.4
GDP 6.5 5.6 4.5 4.2 5.2 4.4
* Includes the statistical discrepancy, represented by the difference between the results of
calculations for production and use. The value 0.0% for the increase in gross capital forma-
tion is the result of rounding: the precise figure is 0.03%.
Table III-2 Contribution to GDP growth by components of use
Percentage changes on a year earlier
Per cent
2000 2001
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Year Q1
Household final consumption
expenditure 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.7
Social transfers in kind 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2
Household consumption 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.9
Public consumption 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Gross fixed capital formation 1.1 1.4 0.7 3.0 1.6 0.8
Gross capital formation* 3.8 1.3 2.7 3.7 2.9 0.0
Domestic absorption, total 5.9 3.5 5.0 6.0 5.2 3.0
Export 11.1 11.2 11.0 14.4 12.0 12.9
Import 10.5 9.1 11.5 16.2 12.0 11.5
Net exports 0.6 2.1 –0.5 –1.8 0.0 1.4
GDP 6.5 5.6 4.5 4.2 5.2 4.4
*Includes the statistical discrepancy, represented by the difference between the results of
calculations for production and use.
1 The employment and wage policies of the public sector will be viewed as
part of fiscal policy, i.e. as factors contributing to aggregate demand.
the projection, the current account deficit for 2001 amounts to
EUR 2.2–2.5 billion (3.8–4.3% of GDP) and to EUR billion
(3.9–4.5% of GDP) for 2002 (see Table III-3). The general govern-
ment’s financing requirement in 2001 rises to 5.5% from 3.6% of
GDP. This rise is partly offset by the private sector’s reduction of
the corporate-sector financing requirement, justified by the ex-
pansion of firms’ disposable income, also including transfers,
and moderate growth in investment relative to income. House-
hold financing capacity decreases as household consumption
and investment rises faster than disposable income, due to a
pick-up in household lending, the easing of liquidity constraints
and a considerable rise in household investment (property in-
vestment, in particular). However, this effect is less powerful
than that of the improvement in the corporate-sector financing
requirement. In the projection for 2002, financing requirement of
the whole economy remains unchanged as a percentage of GDP.
We project that the general government reduces its financing re-
quirement at the same rate as financing capacity deteriorates
within the private sector. The National Bank expects no further
accommodation on the part of the corporate sector, and invest-
ment as a proportion of GDP increases at a similar rate to dispos-
able income growth. Real wage growth slightly falls short of the
rate for 2001, which implies that real income loss arising from ap-
preciation is partially passed on to households. Based on the
forecast that consumption decreases at a lower rate than income,
households on the whole continue to reduce their financing ca-
pacity in 2002.
The projection for the current account of the balance of pay-
ments is derived as the difference between the external financing
requirement and the capital account balance (unrequited foreign
capital transfers). It has also been taken into consideration that
due largely to differences in accounting treatment, balance of
trade data derived from customs statistics and the balance of pay-
ments statistics have shown a roughly EUR 1 billion annual differ-
ence. The projection for 2001 assumes that this difference re-
mains unchanged, while the projection for the current account in
2002 assumes as a risk factor that this difference decreases, which
may add another EUR 500 million to the deficit on the current ac-
count on a cash-flow basis. Based on the above mentioned fac-
tors, the projection for the current account deficit as a proportion
of GDP is in the range of 3.8–4.3% in 2001 and 3.9–4.5% in 2002
(see Table III-4).
Furthermore, the substitution effect of relative import prices
on which appreciation puts downward pressure – leading to a
rise in imports – is another major source of uncertainty in the cur-
rent account projection. In respect of the lower-range of the pro-
jections, this effect is regarded as negligible, while for higher val-
ues, the substitution effect is considered significant, with particu-
lar regard to consumer goods.
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Table III-3 Growth rate of GDP and its components – projection2
Percentage changes on a year earlier
Actual Projection
2000 2001 2002
Household consumption 3.3 4.2–4.8 3.7–4.3
Household final consumption
expenditure 3.8 4.9–5.5 4.2–5.0
Social transfers in kind 1.3 1.4 1.5
Public consumption 1.6 1.3 1.5
Gross frixed capital formation 6.6 8–9 7–8
Exports 21.8 14–16 14–16
Imports 21.1 15–17 14–16
GDP 5.2 4.1–5.1 4.0–4.9
„Final sales" 4.4 4.1–4.7 4.0–4.6
Table III-4 Current account deficit and the financing capacity/requirement
of sectors
As a percentage of GDP
2000 2001 2002
I. General government –3.6 –5.5 –4.8
II. Private sector (1+2) 0.9 1.8 1.1
1 Households 5.1 4.2 3.5
2 Corporate sector* –4.2 –2.4 –2.4
External financing requirement
(I.+II.)** –2.7 –3.7 –3.7
Curent account balance –3.3 –3.8 –4.3 –3.9 –4.5
in EUR billions –1.6 –2.2 –2.5 –2.7 –3.0
* Financial and non-financial enterprises, total.
** On cash-flow basis. The external financing requirement includes both the current account
deficit and the capital account balance.
2 The “Final sales” projection is based on the assumption that stockbuilding
growth, which also includes the statistical discrepancy, is neutral to GDP
growth, equals with consumption, fixed capital formation and net exports
growth. In other words, we assumed a constant stockbuilding rate as a propor-
tion of GDP. The Bank’s macroeconomic projections are based on the Final
sales category, while the projection for total GDP is only given for reference
purposes. Social benefits in kind and public consumption – the estimation and
interpretation of which are surrounded by higher-than-average uncertainty –
are projected using a simple rule of averaging the growth rates of the previous
eight quarters.
1.1 Household consumption
Compared with the moderate rate in 2000, households increased
consumption expenditure at a brisker pace (of 5.4%) in the first
quarter of 2001.3 This marked increase was due to faster growth
in wages and salaries than last year. Real gross earnings rose by
7.2% in 2001 Q1. In terms of government transfers, benefits in
cash and benefits in kind are estimated to have increased by 0.9%
and 1.1%, respectively, in real terms. Taking into account other
components of household income, household real income
growth is estimated to be 4% in 2001 Q1.
Financial savings statistics for 2001 Q1 also indicate greater
propensity to consume by households. The net financing capac-
ity of households also declined in nominal terms, relative to
the same quarter a year earlier (to HUF 10.4 billion4 from HUF
46.9 billion), as a result of a fall in financial assets and an increase
in liabilities.5 Housing loans and consumer credits contributed
nearly equal measure to the increase in liabilities. Thus,
consumer credit continues to play an important role in the
pick-up of consumption, putting nearly 1-percentage-point up-
ward pressure on household consumption expenditures in
2001 Q1.
In addition to stronger propensity to borrow, other indicators
also point to strengthening consumer confidence. The rise in
household confidence indices and the pick-up in new car sales6
also point to an increase in household consumption. In addition,
the drop in the rate of unemployment exerts upward pressure on
aggregate consumption as well (see Chart III-1).
In light of the above factors, the increase in household con-
sumption expenditure is estimated at 5.2% in 2001 and 4.6% in
2002. In 2001, wages and salaries are assumed to grow at a real
rate of over 6%, with the projected rate for 2002 somewhat lower
than that at 5.3%.
The strengthening of the forint may cause this basic trend to
shift in either direction. First of all, the negative wealth effect may
dampen consumption growth both in 2001 and 2002: the nomi-
nal appreciation of the forint will lead to a decrease in the value
of households’ foreign currency deposits expressed in forint
terms, due to revaluation. In an international comparison, how-
ever, with Hungarian households’ low financial wealth to dispos-
able income ratio, financial wealth has low elasticity in relation to
consumption. Therefore, no significant effect is expected
through this channel.
In 2001, the strengthening of the exchange rate has a tempo-
rary positive effect on household consumption via the labour
market channel, while this effect may become negative in 2002.
Due to stronger-than-expected disinflation, a “surprise” increase
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Chart III-1 Household consumption expenditure
and certain related indicators
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Note: Seasonally adjusted data. The first chart shows quarter-on-quarter changes in
household consumption expenditure and new car sales. The other charts show an-
nual growth rates of household consumption expenditure and wages and salaries.
The chart showing the confidence index depicts the level series, and the one with
the rate of unemployment shows the year-on-year change in the trend. Net con-
sumer credits are given in HUF billion at 1995 constant prices.
3 The analysis of household consumption focuses on the category of con-
sumption subject to household decisions, namely household final consump-
tion expenditure (personal spending on consumption) rather than total
household consumption. This is because the rate of social transfers in kind is
not directly affected by household consumption decisions.
4 Data on savings are operational categories, controlling for the effect of com-
pensation for inflation incorporated in interest rates.
5 Changes in financial assets and liabilities also relate to the net operational fi-
nancing capacity.
6 Source of data: Association of Hungarian Car Importers and Magyar Suzuki
Rt.
in real earnings is projected for 2001. From the second half
of 2001, the labour market is assumed to embark on a process
of adjustment via the revision of payments received on an
irregular basis in the first step and then of basic wage settlements,
which is expected to mitigate the above-noted effect. However,
the negative income effect of the appreciation of the exchange
rate may appear in 2002: an end to full corporate accommoda-
tion could reduce the pace of household disposable income
growth.
In 2002, the strengthening of the forint’s exchange rate may re-
tard household consumption growth by 0.3–0.5 percentage
points altogether (see Chart III-2). The greatest uncertainty in this
projection stems from overestimating the degree of wage adjust-
ment assumed for 2002, i.e. from higher real earnings growth
than the central projection. The upside risk associated with real
earnings growth may lead to faster consumption growth.
1.2 Investment
In 2000, investment grew at a moderate rate. Based on the high
rate of capacity utilisation and other indicators, we expected in-
vestment to pick up pace in 2001, but this was not confirmed by
final data for the first-quarter (5.3%) (see Chart III-3). The rate
of investment within the corporate sector remained lower than
expected in respect of both manufacturing and services.
The subdued rate of public investment was one of the factors
contributing to the low volume of investment seen in 2001 Q1.
Direct public-sector investment fell short of the rate for 2000 even
at current prices, and the state-financed motorway construction
projects were behind schedule.
In 2001 Q1, household investment continued to accelerate.
After the trough in 1998/99, investment gathered pace from the
start of 2000, thanks to an upsurge in home building projects.
Based on the seasonally adjusted data, the number of home
building permits started to rise as of mid-1998, which is followed
by an increase in the number of homes built (i.e. actual construc-
tion) with a roughly 1.5-year time lag. One factor behind in-
creased home building expenditure has been the availability of
housing credit with better terms.
In spite of the weaker investment data early in the year, the
projection for growth for 2001 is higher than last year at around
8–9% and the projection for 2002 is 7–8%.
The projection for investment growth in 2001, at 2 percentage
points higher than the rate for 2000, is largely based on a pick-up
in investment by households and an upswing in investment indi-
rectly financed by the state. In addition to steadily increasing ac-
tivity in residential construction, road-construction investment is
projected to be several times higher than the figure for last year.
We expect home building and motorway construction projects to
remain the driving force behind investment in 2002, but the
base-period effect will lower the growth rate.
In the corporate sector, investment indicators and business
surveys point to higher investment activity at the moment, both
in manufacturing and in services (see Chart III-4). Capacity utili-
sation indicators in excess of 80% for a long time now and capital
goods imports both suggest faster growth. Accordingly, invest-
ment growth is forecasted to continue picking up pace in 2001.
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Since investment is relatively rigid, the appreciation of the fo-
rint is projected to make an impact for 2002. The slowdown in the
export demand of manufacturing and the worsening profitability
outlook may put downward pressure on investment. On the
other hand, the fall in the relative prices of capital goods may
stimulate stronger investment within the service sector. Accord-
ing to our estimations the appreciation of the forint will dampen
corporate investment growth by 0.6 percentage points in 2002
(see Table III-5).
The uncertainty surrounding the projections is on the down-
side for both years: road construction may be further postponed
in 2001 and the negative impact of the stronger forint on manu-
facturing investment may be stronger than expected.
1.3 The fiscal stance
According to our projection fiscal policy will be expansionary in
2001, while the fiscal stance is forecasted to be neutral in 2002.
Expansion in demand only takes place gradually, via increasing
capital transfers and road-construction investment and the
higher-than-average rises in civil servants’ wages, in addition to
the easing of the tax burden and social security contributions.
In the first half of 2001, fiscal policy increased demand by
merely 0.4% of GDP through direct channels, but subannual de-
velopments cannot be relied on due to the annual nature of fiscal
policy (see Table III-6).
In terms of the official projections, the direct increase in de-
mand amounts to 2.4% of GDP in 2001, of which the official pri-
mary balance accounts for 0.5% and other SNA factors [ÁPV Rt
(Hungarian Privatisation and State Holding Company), MFB Rt
(Hungarian Development Bank Ltd.), concession-related re-
ceipts, deposit account] for 1.9%. As in the previous year, against
the background of higher than officially projected inflation, gen-
eral government revenues will also be higher. The main tax bases
(such as consumption and wages) are assumed to increase at a
faster rate than the official plan, even in real terms. In this Re-
port’s central projection, about 50% of the receipts arising from
the better-than-planned position will be spent in a way that is ex-
pected to stimulate demand. In the central projection, the direct
fiscal impact on demand in 2001 is assumed to be 2.1%.
The fiscal stance for 2002 is determined to a great extent by
the balance in 2001, since the budget target relates to the level
and not the movement of the deficit. If expansion in demand
is greater in 2001, this could entail a restriction of demand in
2002, and vice versa. The base effect of these excess receipts and
excess spending taking place in 2001 may improve the primary
balance by 0.3% of GDP (0.1–0.5%), and developments during
this year may result in a further improvement of 0.2%. The reason
for this lies more in the conservative official projections of re-
ceipts than in inflation or real developments (tax bases) diverg-
ing from the plan. The assumption is that fiscal policy is assumed
to use one-half of the excess receipts in a way that stimulates de-
mand, leading to an increase in demand at 0.2% of GDP.
The public sector’s demand effect manifests itself partly
through wage payments. In 2001 and 2002, public-sector aver-
age wages are projected to rise by over 18% and 15%, respec-
tively. This takes place simultaneously with a 1% lay-off rate of
public-sector workers in both years.
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Table III-5 Sectoral breakdown of investment
Volume indices, percentage changes on a year earlier
Per cent
Actual Projection
2000* 2001 2002
Corporate sector 4.6 6–6.5 5.5–6.0
Of which:
Manufacturing 4.1 5.5–6.5 4–5
Services 5.5 6–6.5 7–8
State** 13.2 14–16 8–9
Of which:
Direct by state-financed 10.8 3–3.5 3–3.5
Households 8.5 11–13 10–12
Total 6.6 8–9 7–8
* The sectoral breakdown for 2000 represents National Bank estimates.
** Includes the state’s direct investment and spending on motorway construction.
Chart III-4 Investment and certain related indicators
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Table III-6 General government’s demand effect
Volume indices, percentage of GDP
Per cent
1999 2000
2001 2002
Plan
Fore-
cast
Plan
Fore-
cast
1 Change in SNA operational
deficit (2+3) –0.9 –1.0 2.1 1.8 0.0 0.2
2 Indirect demand effect
(Change in real interest rates) –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 0.0 0.0
3 Direct effect (4+5)
(Change in SNA primary balance) –0.6 –0.6 2.4 2.1 0.0 0.2
4 Change in GFS primary balance –1.3 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.8
5 Change in other factors
(SNA corrections) 0.7 –1.1 1.9 1.9 –0.5 –0.6
All in all, in the period between 1998 and 2002, the operational
deficit – adjusted for the effect of the pension reform – is assumed
to remain virtually unchanged, while the SNA-based primary bal-
ance deteriorates by 1–1.1% of GDP, due to the fact that the 1%
improvement arising from indirect factors is used by fiscal policy
to reduce its revenues (tax burden and social security contribu-
tions).
1.4 External trade
Until end-2000, growth in goods and services exports gathered
increasing pace. By contrast, data on 2001 Q1 point to a slow-
down, with export and import growth down by 3.5 and 9 per-
centage points, respectively, on the previous quarter.
The development of external demand (foreign imports
weighted with Hungarian export structure) is a key factor behind
slowing export growth. After peaking at end-2000, growth in
weighted foreign imports lost significant momentum from 2001
Q1. Foreign import demand continued to expand at an acceler-
ating rate in the course of 2000, despite the fact that the weighted
GDP of Hungary’s trading partners seemed to have slowed down
during the second six months. The remainder of 2001 is pro-
jected to witness a further decline, but from 2002, international
institutions expect another wave of recovery.
The real exchange rate based on unit labour costs depreci-
ated at a steadily slowing rate until 2000 Q3 to be replaced by an
annualised rate of 1–2% appreciation in real terms. The projec-
tion for 2001 and 2002 is 8% and around 5% rate of real apprecia-
tion for the year as a whole (see Chart III-6).
As a result of the changes in the business cycle position and
unit labour costs, in 2001, goods exports are projected to fall by
8 percentage points in terms of volume growth. The slowdown is
primarily due to worsening external demand, with the effect of
real appreciation estimated to be less than one percentage point
(see Chart III-7).
In 2002 export growth is assumed to be similar to that in 2001.
This is because in 2002 business cycle factors exert favourable in-
fluence on export trends, being partially offset by the – now full –
effect of real appreciation projected at 1.5–2 percentage points.
The sharp decline in goods imports growth experienced in the
first quarter was influenced by the flat rate of gross capital forma-
tion, in addition to weaker export growth (see Chart III-5). Simul-
taneously with the extraordinary stockbuilding episode re-
corded in the final quarter of 2000, the rate at which goods im-
ports grew was over 2 percentage points higher than that of ex-
ports, the correction of which took place in 2001 Q1.7
For 2001, growth in goods imports is projected to slow by 7 per-
centage points, to be followed by another 0.5-percentage-point
decline in 2002. In 2001, the slowdown in exports puts down-
ward pressure of around 5 percentage points on imports. Import
growth for the whole of the year falls by nearly 3 percentage
points because we do not expect stockbuilding on a similar scale
to the previous year. The real appreciation of the exchange rate
exerts upward pressure on goods imports (of roughly 0.5–1 per-
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7 For more on stockbuilding, please refer to the footnote attached to the GDP
projection.
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Chart III-6 Changes in external demand
and the real exchange rate based on unit labour costs*
Percentage changes on a year earlier
* External demand: weighted imports of Hungary’s main international trading
partners. Real exchange rate: based on unit labour cost in manufacturing cost. Na-
tional Bank of Hungary estimates.
** Negative figure implies real appreciation.
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Chart III-7 Goods exports and imports
Percentage changes on a year earlier
centage points for the year as a whole) in 2001, via the substitu-
tion effect. However, in 2002, weaker domestic absorption is as-
sumed to reduce imports by 0.5–1.5 percentage points.8
The largest risk is represented by the external conjunctural
position. If foreign demand grows on a similar scale as in 2001,
growth in goods exports could decline by 2 percentage points
and that of imports by 1–1.5 percentage points.
In 2001 Q1, the services balance continued to contribute to the
improvement on the external balance. The balance of services
ran a EUR 45 million higher surplus than a year earlier, thanks to
an increase in the travel surplus.
In 2001, real appreciation is projected to hamper the improve-
ment on the travel balance, and confidence indicators of travel
industry also point in the direction of less favourable trends.9 The
assumption for 2002 is that the negative effect of real apprecia-
tion is offset by stronger external activity.
2 Supply factors –
the labour market
Over the forecast horizon, developments in the labour mar-ket determine the real economic costs of exchange-
rate-based disinflation. This is because against an inflexible
background of wage settlements based on high inflation expec-
tations, the appreciating exchange rate and disinflation in the
goods markets are assumed to put downward pressure on corpo-
rate profitability via both the income and cost sides. This will in
turn slow the process of disinflation relative to the National
Bank’s projection. However, if the labour market is flexible, then
enterprises are capable of mitigating the negative effects of both
the income shocks and the faster-than-expected disinflation by
reducing growth in labour costs.
While nominal wage settlements are negotiated for longer pe-
riods in advance, a number of prices (especially import prices)
respond relatively quickly to changes in the nominal exchange
rate. Consequently, appreciation could lead to a surprise rise in
real earnings over the short term. In an inflexible labour market
this undermines corporate profitability, while in a flexible labour
market companies can either adapt to the situation by adjusting
non-regular pay or by adjusting staff numbers – depending on
the nature of the wage settlements. In view of the specific charac-
teristics of the Hungarian labour market, the Bank’s assumption
is that firms will first try to adapt by reducing non-regular pay
(such as bonuses and premiums): hence, no considerable nega-
tive employment effect is projected for 2001. In 2002, nominal
wage settlements may also be revised, entailing moderate in-
creases in real earnings and dampened employment effects.
Hungarian economic growth has been characterised by an ex-
tensive expansion of labour use in recent years. In the first quar-
ter of 2001, private-sector labour use continued to increase. Si-
multaneously, the rate of unemployment declined even further,
AUGUST 2001 • QUARTERLY REPORT ON INFLATION 25
III. Determinants of inflation
8 In the Report we assumed that the change in import prices has the following
effect on consumption: a 1% relative change in the price of a product will
cause the consumer to make a 1% change in the consumption of that product.
9 The indices have been constructed by the GKI (Institute for Economic
Research) at the request of the Hungarian Tourism Co.
with a rise in the participation rate, leading to an increase in both
labour use and capacity utilisation. Employment growth within
the private sector was robust, both in the sectors of manufactur-
ing and of services (see Chart III-8).10
In effect, the expansion of employment can rely only on eco-
nomically active (employed and unemployed) people as a la-
bour pool. At the start of the year, 6% of the economically active
were unemployed. Not all of these unemployed provide an effec-
tive labour reserve since the proportion of unqualified, less edu-
cated and long-term unemployed is rather high, and the geo-
graphical mobility of this group is low. The possibility of la-
bour-market bottlenecks appearing is increased by the fact that
unemployment in the central parts of Hungary west of the Dan-
ube hardly exceeds 4%, implying that the industrial activity in the
area and the associated services will have to face tight labour
supply.
The number of hours worked by manual workers is another
indicator of the tightness of the labour market. The past year has
seen an increase in per capita monthly hours worked in the pri-
vate sector, against the backdrop of rising employment, which
could be viewed as a sign of adjustment on the intensive margin.
However, first-quarter data imply an interruption of this trend,
with the number of daily average hours worked by the manual la-
bour force remaining flat. Thus, in the light of a slowdown in em-
ployment growth, the stagnation in hours worked and the cycli-
cal slowdown expected to take place this year, the Bank does not
project the sectoral and regional tightening to become wide-
spread over the forecast horizon.
2.1 Wage inflation
In measuring labour costs, the combined effect of wage infla-
tion11 and changes in tax regulations should be taken into ac-
count. In January 2001, the minimum wage was raised from HUF
25,500 to HUF 40,000. As a result, first-quarter official wage statis-
tics indicated an over 20% rise in average earnings in the private
sector, which is due partly to a statistical bias which has been
eliminated from our corrected wage inflation index (see Chart
III-9).
According to Bank estimates, actual wage inflation was much
lower than that suggested by official employment statistics. The
bias arises from the fact that in parts of the economy, previous ac-
tual wages effectively paid out exceeded the level of the official
minimum wage, while taxes and social security contributions
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Chart III-9 Wage inflation in the private sector*
Percentage changes on a year earlier
*Twelve-month data on businesses employing over five people recalculated using
a statistical method; both the minimum wage effect and the seasonal fluctuations
have been removed from the data (see related comments in text above).
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Chart III-8 Number of employed people*
* Central Statistical Office labour force survey (LFS). Based on seasonally adjusted
data. Quarter-on-quarter changes, annualised in the non-public sector, excluding
agriculture.
10 This information has been derived from the household labour force statis-
tics. This seems to be in contrast with the flat employment rate recorded by in-
stitutional statistics based on a survey of enterprises. An increase in the num-
ber of entrepreneurs relative to employees helps explain the discrepancy, in
addition to the rising popularity – at least according to statistical records – of
part-time or contract-based employment. These all might provide the em-
ployer with an escape route from high payment obligations associated with
the substantially higher minimum wages and/or wage costs. On the other
hand, this may introduce a bias into official statistics, leading to an understate-
ment of employment rates (and an overstatement of wage inflation, see later
sections).
11 Since the National Bank’s wage inflation index removes the effects of sec-
toral and structural composition and the number of working days from the
data published by the Central Statistical Office, it represents the actual in-
crease in the price of labour.
were based on the official minimum wage.CSO statistics based
on a survey of businesses imply an exceptional rise in official
wages, thus overstating actual earnings growth. Another in-
stance of corporate adjustment to the January rise in minimum
wage was the change in the status of workers from full time to
part time, and presumably, some firms dismissed less produc-
tive, low-paid staff. This resulted in a shift in the employment
structure towards higher-paid labour, introducing another up-
ward bias into wage statistics. The statistical bias was most pro-
nounced in small enterprises and in the services sector.
Removing this bias arising from minimum wage-related fac-
tors, the seasonally adjusted data on wage inflation points to a
stabilisation of wage inflation at a high level rather than a persis-
tent increase.
Due to stronger-than-expected disinflation, high nominal la-
bour cost increases early in the year may lead to excess labour
cost growth in real terms over the short term in 2001. In the pay
structure of the private sector, pay components received on an ir-
regular basis (bonus, premium, etc.) account for nearly one-fifth
of total earnings. For the most part, this type of earnings is con-
centrated over the last months of the year. This enables employ-
ers to curb potential losses via this kind of pay provided on an ir-
regular basis over the second half of the year.
In 2002, worsening profitability prospects are assumed to
force companies to adopt a more restrictive wage policy as early
as the start of the year, and even earnings received on a regular
basis are likely to grow at a slower rate. In the event of less flexi-
ble labour market accommodation than assumed in the basic
projection, this high nominal wage growth may result in higher
real labour costs. Therefore, the risks to the Bank’s wage projec-
tion for 2002 are weighted to the upside.
Even though the rise in minimum wages would likely be – for
the first time in the history of Hungarian minimum wage hikes –
binding in 2002 and is thus a potential source of negative em-
ployment effects, it does not affect the market of higher-
productivity qualified labour, leaving both the labour market
bottlenecks and the economic growth rate unaffected.
In 2002, employers’ social security contributions are pro-
jected to decrease by 2 percentage points.12 The Report’s projec-
tion is based on the hypothesis that employers use this reduction
to mitigate profit losses arising from the appreciation of the forint
rather than sharing the savings in labour taxes with employees.
The public sector is assumed to show a strong rate of wage in-
creases in both years of the projection. However, we do not ex-
pect this to affect wage rates or employment significantly in the
private sector, since the two sectors have different structures,
both in terms of occupational structure and levels of qualifica-
tion. Substitutability is also weakened by the low geographical
mobility of the Hungarian labour force.
On the whole, the projection for private sector gross earnings
growth envisages a downward move from 16% in 2000 to 14% in
2001 and below 10% in 2002, for the year as a whole. This puts
real labour cost growth at 3–4% this year and 2–3% in 2002.
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12 Assuming a constant wage bill, this enables a 1.5% savings in wage costs.
3 Imported inflation
The key determinants of imported inflation include the worldprice for crude oil, the euro-dollar exchange rate and
euro-area tradable goods prices. Changes in oil prices and cross
exchange rates affect domestic fuel and household energy prices
both directly and indirectly, in addition to longer-term effects on
market service prices by influencing production costs. Tradable
goods price inflation recorded by Hungary’s main trading part-
ners affects the Hungarian tradable goods price level first by
changing production costs and second by being directly incor-
porated in the prices of consumer goods imports (see Chart
III-10).
In 2001 Q1, the rise in imported inflationary pressure, which
started in late 2000, continued. The fall in the world prices for oil
and the strengthening of the euro appeared to put downward
pressure on imported inflation, while inflation experienced by
Hungary’s main trading partners – i.e. increases in euro-area
tradable goods prices – had an opposite effect. By contrast, in the
second quarter, all three factors of imported inflation appeared to
increase inflationary pressure.
Following the earlier rapid increases, the price of crude oil be-
gan to decrease slightly in the final quarter of 2000. However, in
May and June prices began to edge up again, eventually stabilis-
ing in the range of USD 24–25. The path of world prices for oil can
be forecast using information derived from option prices. This
appears to be more reliable than conventional forecasts by ana-
lysts as there is “genuine” trade at the indicated prices. A compar-
ison of the prices in April and July also provides information on
the course of market consensus. The fan charts depict the implicit
path of the price for oil as suggested by option prices on the fore-
cast horizon to mid-2002. The central range clearly shows that
market participants expect a gradual decrease in the level of oil
prices. The two distribution charts illustrate the likelihood of ex-
treme outcomes, with the balance of risks about oil prices
weighted to the downside (see Charts III-11 and III-12).
After a temporary strengthening at the start of 2001, in the sec-
ond quarter the euro/dollar exchange rate returned to the rate of
0.87 seen at end-2000. Major foreign investment banks average
forecasts for three, six and twelve months ahead predict an ap-
preciation of the euro. However, the size of the appreciation
grows smaller with each forecast date as the year progresses (see
Table III-7).
Until June 2001, annual inflation in tradable goods excluding
energy prices rose by one percentage point in the euro area. The
steady increases involving effectively each item in the category
of tradable goods pushed up the headline rate to 1.6%. Rising in-
flation reflected the protracted impact of import price increases
in 1999/2000, the feed-through of recent oil price increases and
euro depreciation into tradable goods prices. The euro-area trad-
able goods price index, after reaching historical highs unseen for
the past four years, is projected to gradually slow down over the
next one and a half years. According to a number of international
institutional forecasters producer price disinflation within the
euro area, which began in 2001 Q1, continues and inflation de-
clines to 1.5–2% at end-2002. Headline CPI measured in terms of
the HICP is projected by the ECB to rise by 2.3–2.7% in 2001 and
28 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
III. Determinants of inflation
Chart III-11 Projection based on oil option prices*
Average for 2000 = 100
* National Bank estimate derived from option prices of WTI oil.
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Chart III-10 Inflation rates in the euro area
Percentage changes on a year earlier
Table III-7 Forecast for the euro/dollar exchange rate*
Per cent
Forecast date
Forecast horizon
Three
months
Six
months
Twelve
months
April 2001 0.93 0.96 0.95
May 2001 0.91 0.92 0.92
June 2001 0.88 0.88 0.89
* Given as the mean of forecasts by 11 major investment banks.
by 1.2–2.4% in 2002. The July poll of the weekly Economist fore-
casts euro-area inflation to be at 2.7% this year and 1.9% next
year.
4 Effect of regulation
and extraordinary factors
Regulated prices, accounting for roughly one-fifth of the con-sumer basket, are expected to increase by 7.8% for the year
as a whole. This is assumed to comprise energy price increases of
about 8.5% and service price rises of 6.6%. With regard to ser-
vices, rent and community charges are expected to increase by
9–11%. Based on fiscal projections and commitments, the rise in
the services price level is projected at 6.5% in 2002. This rate com-
prises 8% and 5.5% increases in energy and service prices, re-
spectively.
Excise duty rates are projected to be similar to those in 2001,
barring one important exception. Excise duties on vehicle fuel
(the tax on petrol has been HUF 93 since 2000) will not be raised
this year because of high oil prices. The Bank’s assumption is that
valorisation will only take place in July 2002, near the deadline
set by the Government. The rise then will bring the rate up to the
level set by the excise duty Act (to HUF 103 + VAT). This move is
expected to pull up fuel prices by nearly 6%.
As noted above, the May jump in the price for pork, at an
annualised rate of 68%, led to an inflationary shock. Another un-
foreseen factor was the higher increase in cereal prices, (at 40%
between January and May 2001), due to poor weather conditions
last year. These unforeseen effects could not be offset by regula-
tory devices, which led to a nearly 2 percentage point excess in-
flation in the CPI, due to the increase in agricultural producer
prices. Nevertheless, the remainder of the year is expected to wit-
ness more effective regulation in greater accord with the require-
ment of price smoothing. The central projection includes a sta-
bilisation of producer prices for meat in the second half of 2001
and the first half of 2002.
At the same time, the balance of risks about the assumptions
on domestic agricultural prices is on the upside, as it is possible
that meat market participants will not comply with the agreed
self-imposed price restrictions. This may resulting in meat prices
continuing to rise in the second half of 2001. Another extraordi-
nary inflationary pressure may arise from the tightening of ani-
mal health regulations, while the WTO agreement on reducing
export subsidies, effective from the start of 2002, may in turn put
downward pressure on agricultural prices.13
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Chart III-12 Changes in the distribution of oil options
prices*
Average for 2000 = 100. The dotted line represents data
based on April NIMEX quotations and the full line those
based on July NIMEX quotations
* National Bank estimate derived from option prices of WTI oil.
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13 This effect could be neutralised by allocating subsidies through different
channels.
The National Bank’s inflation projection is organized alongconsumer basket categories which exhibit clearly distinct
patterns and were developed at the NBH. The projection as-
sumes stable monetary conditions throughout the entire forecast
horizon, since it is aimed at informing market participants of the
probability of achieving the set inflation target if monetary condi-
tions remain unchanged. In practice, the inflation projection is
based on taking the average forint exchange rate (HUF
247.1/euro) of the last complete calendar month (June 2001) as
constant for six three-month periods.
1 The forecast
In the Bank’s central projection, CPI inflation would be 7.7% in De-cember 2001 and 4.2% in December 2002, which implies average
annual rates of 9.3% and 5.4%, respectively. The Bank considers the
uncertainty associated with this central projection to be significant
in both years. The risks around the central inflation projection are
weighted to the upside in 2001, due to the uncertainty about unpro-
cessed meat prices. By contrast, the distribution of risks is forecast to
be symmetrical in the projection for 2002.
Comparing the central projections and the shape of the uncer-
tainty distribution with the inflation targets suggests that the cen-
tral projection in December 2002 falls in the lower part of the tar-
get range, but the risk of inflation exceeding the upper target of
5.5% is not negligible (at 30%). With regard to the December 2001
target, even the central projection falls in the upper edge of the
target range: thus, there is a greater probability (40%) of inflation
exceeding the 8% upper limit. At the same time, the probability of
inflation falling below the lower limit of the target range set by
the National Bank – i.e. of “excessive” disinflation – is forecast to
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Table IV-1 Central projections for inflation*
Percentage changes on a year earlier
Per cent
<– Actual data Projection –>
Basket
weight
2000 2001 2002
Dec./Dec. Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Dec./Dec. Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Dec./Dec.
Food 19.0 13.6 16.6 19.5 13.6 15.8 15.8 15.2 9.1 5.6 4.9 4.8
Unprocessed (5.3) 17.4 17.8 20.9 10.3 14.4 14.5 14.1 8.3 3.4 3.7 4.1
Processed (13.7) 12.1 16.2 19.0 15.1 16.3 16.3 15.6 9.5 6.5 5.4 5.1
Tradables 26.8 4.9 5.0 5.2 4.3 2.9 2.3 1.5 0.2 –0.6 –1.1 –1.1
Market services 20.4 12.5 13.3 11.9 10.4 9.1 8.7 7.8 7.8 7.2 6.7 6.5
Market-priced energy 1.3 34.0 32.4 22.8 13.6 0.0 –2.4 –2.8 –1.5 –1.4 –1.3 –1.2
Vehicle fuel 5.0 15.2 5.3 3.3 –4.9 –6.8 –5.0 –0.9 –4.3 6.6 6.5 6.5
Alcohol and tobacco 9.1 11.3 11.3 11.7 11.5 10.8 10.8 10.6 8.8 8.4 8.1 8.1
Regulated prices 18.5 7.6 7.6 8.0 9.4 8.5 8.6 8,4 7.3 6.6 6.5 6.5
CPI 100.0 10.1 10.3 10.6 8.6 7.9 7.7 7.3 5.3 4.6 4.2 4.2
Annual average 9.8 9.3 5.4
* The uncertainty intervals associated with the central projection are shown in Chart IV-1.
IV. Forecast of th consumer price index
and risk assessment
be at only 10% in December 2001, but 40% in December 2002
(see Table IV-1).
Achieving the inflation target set for monetary policy is based
on a sharp decrease in the tradables goods price index, via the
exchange rate channel. In the projection, the strengthening of
the nominal exchange rate will have a gradual impact depending
on the exchange-rate pass-through. On the whole, tradable
prices are projected to deflate slightly by 2002, with the category
of durable tradable goods affected first.
Inflation of market services generally takes a longer time to
change, and its rate generally exceeds that of headline inflation.
The reason for this is that over the long term the persistent pro-
ductivity differential between the tradable and nontradable
sectors creates excess services price inflation. At the same time,
the pick-up in domestic demand, cost-side pressures and, to
a certain extent, inflation inertia are also among the factors that
excess inflation in market services prices relative to tradables
prices will fluctuate in the range of 6 to 8% in the future.
Movements in unprocessed foodstuff prices are characterised
by extreme volatility and can be viewed as exogenous to mone-
tary policy over the short term. Due to high base values last year,
there will be a temporary drop in the annual price inflation of un-
processed foodstuffs in the next quarter. Disinflation will only ac-
celerate from the second half of 2002. Changes in processed food
prices are partly governed by unprocessed food price inflation
and partly by other demand and cost-side factors. Disinflation for
this category is also projected to gain momentum most clearly in
2002 H2.
As regards vehicle fuel, the exchange-rate pass-through is
practically instantaneous. Up to mid-2002, the assumption for
petrol prices is downwards, due to the base effect and assuming
constant world prices for petrol. This downward trend is inter-
rupted in the middle of next year, due to a rise in excise duties.
Against the assumptions of constant world market prices for en-
ergy and a fixed forint exchange rate, market-priced household
energy prices, accounting for a small share in the consumer bas-
ket, are projected to undergo steady disinflation.
Alcohol and tobacco prices, influenced indirectly by the
authorities through excise duties, are assumed to follow the
trend of headline CPI. There will be a considerable rise in the tax
content included in the price of such goods. As such products
have low demand elasticity and market competition is weak,
the assumption is that producers will pass on the excise tax in-
crease fully to consumers by raising their prices. Changes in
directly regulated prices are viewed as exogenous over the fore-
cast horizon.
2 Assumptions
of the central projection
Asset prices and world energy prices are difficult to forecast.Therefore, National Bank projections use average values for
the last observed month with regard to both the relevant (Medi-
terranean) petrol prices (at EUR 331/tonne, equalling roughly
USD 26.7/barrel for Brent oil) and the euro/dollar cross rate (EUR
0.854 to the USD).
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Chart IV-1 Inflation projection*
Percentage changes on a year earlier
* The fan chart depicts the probability distribution of the outcomes around the
central projection. The central band with the darkest shade covers the central pro-
jection. The entire shaded area covers 90% of all probabilities, with a 5%-5%
likelihood that the inflation outcome will fall outside the uppermost or lowest
shaded band. Around the central projection, the bands each represent a 15%
probability. The uncertainty intervals have been estimated on the basis of the
Bank’s past forecasting errorse, taking into account the uncertainties associated
with current projection. The two white dots represent the December inflation
target points (7% and 4.5%); the straight lines mark the ±1% tolerance band on
either side of the target rates.
Exchange rate pass-through is assumed to be the most impor-
tant monetary transmission channel. The pass-through parame-
ter measures the extent and duration of the change which a given
shift in the exchange rate triggers in domestic prices. Since there
is no Hungarian precedent for either nominal appreciation or
such a flexible exchange rate regime, the magnitude of the effect
can only be calibrated using international experience (see Spe-
cial topics). Accordingly, in the central case the projections as-
sume that in respect of tradable goods the exchange-rate
pass-through amounts to 50% over the one year horizon and 75%
over two years. With regard to the entire CPI, this represents a
nearly 20% pass-through over the projection horizon of one and
a half years.1 Tradable goods prices are also strongly influenced
by imported inflation. German tradable goods price inflation is
assumed to be the relevant import price index in respect of Hun-
garian tradable goods. It differs from the traditional import price
index insofar as it captures import price changes specifically with
respect to consumer goods rather than intermediate and capital
goods.
In respect of non-tradable goods (with special regard to mar-
ket-priced services), in addition to tradable goods price inflation,
a crucial role is also played by domestic demand, which the Na-
tional Bank has also set in numerical terms in the projection for
the sum of household consumption expenditure and invest-
ment, and for household real income. 2
Of the supply-side (cost) factors with an impact on inflation,
(1) productivity growth; (2) labour costs; and (3) agricultural raw
material prices have been taken into account. The last of these
factors represents an especially great uncertainty and is not inde-
pendent of agricultural market regulation.
Prices regulated or influenced by the state authorities are also
viewed as exogenous from the point of view of monetary policy.
Projections for this category, accounting for nearly one-fifth
of the CPI, are prepared on an item by item basis with the knowl-
edge of the Budget Act.
3 Balance of risks
The distribution of forecast uncertainty associated with thecentral projection is asymmetrical in 2001: the risk of a 1% di-
vergence from the 7.7% central projection is weighted to the up-
side. This is primarily due to the inflationary risk associated with
raw meat prices. By contrast, the uncertainty of the inflation pro-
jection for 2002 is symmetrical: the probability of a ±1% diver-
gence from the 4.2% rate is similar in both directions.
All the above factors relate to the inflation projection itself, in-
dependent of its relation to the inflation target. From a monetary
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1 The seemingly low rate of exchange rate pass-through is based on the as-
sumption that over the forecast horizon (1) regulated prices will not respond
to an exchange rate change; (2) the same is to be expected in the case of alco-
hol and tobacco, with prices governed by rather inflexible inflation expecta-
tions; (3) unprocessed food prices are likewise not sensitive to exchange rate
changes over the short term. Also, this estimate is based on the assumptions of
exogenous wages. In all, that 20% estimate refers to a partial or technical inter-
pretation; the “general” estimate being probably larger than 20%.
2 As public goods and social transfers in kind are not directly represented in the
goods market as effective demand, they typically exert indirect inflationary
pressure.
policy point of view, however, it seems expedient to compare
the central path of the inflation projection and the uncertainty
distribution with the target rates set for inflation. In December
2001, there is a high likelihood of inflation exceeding the upper
(8%) tolerance limit. By contrast, at end-2002, there is a greater
probability of inflation falling below the bottom tolerance limit,
due to the central projection falling below the 4.5% target and the
distribution being symmetric. It should be noted, however, that
the uncertainty of the projection is much higher over the 1.5-year
horizon.
The following key factors have a significant bearing on the un-
certainty of the inflation projections and the shape of the proba-
bility distribution. As far as the euro/dollar cross rate is con-
cerned, the divergence in the distribution from the assumption
based on the constant average June rate is symmetrical in 2001,
while in 2002, there is greater likelihood of a slightly stronger
euro exchange rate, according to the market consensus. The un-
certainty surrounding global energy prices is asymmetrical both
in the short and the long terms. This is because in 2001, the prices
of petrol and oil began to diverge from each other, due to one-off
events, and this divergence may be corrected towards lower
petrol prices. At the same time, information derived from the
NIMEX options market indicates the probability of lower oil
prices in 2002.
As noted above, in respect of imported inflation the Bank’s as-
sumptions pertain to the long-term trend, thus the related uncer-
tainty distribution is assumed to be symmetrical. The numerical
significance of this lies in the fact that every 1-percentage-point
rise in international tradable goods price inflation will raise head-
line CPI by 0.3 percentage point.
In respect of domestic absorption, the central projection for
household consumer demand, which has more significance for
inflation, is weighted slightly to the upside in 2002, which may
cause an upward shift in the services price index. However, this
has only negligible numerical effect on headline inflation.
The distribution of the uncertainty surrounding the estimate
for exchange-rate pass-through is also symmetrical. A stronger
or weaker outcome than projected has an equal likelihood,
depending on exchange rate volatility, domestic product market
competition and other factors. A stronger outcome of 67%,
instead of the 50% annual assumption for the tradable goods cat-
egory would push down projected inflation by 0.3–0.4 percent-
age points in December 2001 and by 0.2 percentage points in De-
cember 2002. A weaker outcome of 33% would cause inflation to
be 0.4 percentage points higher at the end of both years.
As noted above, labour market adjustments in 2002 suggest
that the risks surrounding the projection for real earnings is
weighted to the upside, introducing positive uncertainty into the
inflation projection both from the demand (consumption) and
supply (cost) sides. The assumption on productivity is based on a
long-term trend, thus potential divergences would only prove in-
flationary over the longer term.
The uncertainty surrounding the development of agricultural
raw material prices is extremely high. The balance of risks associ-
ated with meat prices is clearly on the upside in 2001, which is of
crucial importance. The uncertainty about regulated prices is as-
sumed to be symmetrical.
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IV. Forecast of th consumer price index and risk assessment
4 Market participants’ inflation
expectations
Inflation expectations of money market and economic researchinstitutes’ analysts for end-2001 are practically identical with
the National Bank’s central projection. By contrast, market fore-
casts for December 2002 are higher than the Bank’s projection
(see Chart IV-2).
Following the band-widening and the subsequent announce-
ment of the inflation targeting regime, money market partici-
pants revised their inflation forecasts for end-2002 downwards.
Nevertheless, the latest forecasts are still higher on average than
the Bank’s projection. Since the Reuters survey suggests that
macroanalysts expect the exchange rate to essentially be the
same as the June average (the basis for the National Bank central
projection), the difference cannot be attributed to differences in
exchange-rate expectations, but rather to those associated with
the exchange-rate pass-through.
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Chart IV-2 Market analysts’ inflation forecasts
Reuters poll, excluding research institutes
Note: the expected inflation path is derived from the average of expectations and
from those relating to December and the subsequent month, choosing the curve
that most smoothly fits the actual data. Inflation rates are shown relative to a year
earlier.
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1 New system of monetary policy
Objective of monetary policy
The Act on the National Bank of Hungary, enacted by Par-
liament and effective as of 13 July 2001, defines the primary
objective of the Bank as the achievement and maintenance
of price stability. The National Bank contributes to the en-
hancement of social prosperity and long-term economic
growth by fostering a predictable and stable economic en-
vironment. The Act seeks to facilitate the achievement of
low inflation by reinforcing and extending safeguards for
central bank independence, in accordance with EU re-
quirements.
Using an inflation targeting system, in the next cou-
ple of years the National Bank seeks to achieve a gradual
but firm reduction in inflation to around 2%, practically
corresponding to price stability. The Bank’s objective is to
help Hungary meet the Maastricht criterion on inflation in
2004–2005. This is a necessary condition for Hungary’s en-
try to the Economic and Monetary Union in 2006–2007.
Accordingly, the National Bank, in agreement with the
Government, has set an inflation target of 7% for Decem-
ber 2001 and 4.5% for December 2002. Aware of the fact
that an instant offsetting of unexpected inflationary shocks
would necessitate an active monetary policy that eco-
nomic agents would find very difficult to adjust to, the
National Bank has set a ±1% tolerance band on both sides
of the announced disinflation path. This band allows for
unexpected inflationary pressures causing a temporary
upward or downward shift in the desired rate of price in-
creases. Nevertheless, the Bank will respond to any persis-
tent deviations from the announced path by easing or
tightening monetary policy.
Why was the change necessary?
The narrow-band crawling peg exchange rate system, in-
troduced in 1995, had two objectives. Its primary aim was
to break the adverse trend of inflation expectations and es-
tablish the credibility of monetary policy. This monetary
policy regime, founded on a predictable, pre-announced
exchange rate path, was successful in bringing down the
rate of inflation from over 30% to 10% and in enhancing
economic competitiveness. However, over the past two
years, there was no further decline in the rate of inflation.
Although the factors to blame for this unfavourable devel-
opment included a series of negative inflationary shocks
and a higher rate of imported inflation over the past two
years, there was also an increasing risk of inflation expec-
tations becoming “stuck” and inflation inertia building up.
This reflected a decline in the efficiency of the crawling
peg regime, under which the Bank regarded disinflation
based on coordinating expectations as its primarily objec-
tive. The central bank had to subordinate its interest rate
policy to external developments – in fact, the only freedom
left for the Bank and the Government lay in setting the
magnitude and date of decreases in the rate of devaluation.
The National Bank’s senior decision makers drafted a
proposal for the Government on the establishment of a
system providing greater independence for monetary pol-
icy in pursuing a relatively faster and more effective
anti-inflationary policy. The cornerstone of this new policy
was a restructuring of the exchange rate regime. Based on
the joint decision of the National Bank and the Govern-
ment, the Bank widened the intervention band of the fo-
rint’s exchange rate to ±15% as of 4 May 2001, while retain-
ing the 0.2% monthly rate of devaluing the forint’s central
parity. A key consideration in setting the new fluctuation
band was the idea that by further reducing and ultimately
eliminating the forint’s devaluation, the system will be-
come compatible with ERM II, the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism. Facilitating a more effective transmission
of monetary policy actions also required the elimination of
some existing restrictions on capital flows, which became
effective as of 18 June 2001.
How will the new system function?
The objective of monetary policy is to achieve and main-
tain price stability. The central bank’s primary instrument
in attaining this goal is to change its benchmark rates. In
this way, the Bank can influence inflation partly through
the exchange rate’s direct disciplinary power over price in-
creases and partly through the effect of the real exchange
rate and real interest rates on aggregate demand. In small
countries such as Hungary, the exchange rate channel is
the central bank’s most powerful and fastest means of in-
fluencing domestic prices. Therefore, the exchange rate
will retain its prominent role even though the Bank has
much smaller power over the path of the exchange rate
than under the previous narrow-band regime. In the fu-
ture, if the National Bank wishes to influence the exchange
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rate in support of the inflation target, it will do so primarily
by changing interest rates. The option to intervene in the
foreign-exchange markets will be reserved for emergency
situations when, in addition to other measures, interven-
tion is also needed in order to stabilise the market and ex-
pectations.
The extent of the exchange rate change triggered by
central bank interest rate moves cannot be foreseen, as it is
primarily determined by the expectations of money and
capital market participants. Therefore, future monetary
decisions will continue to be taken with due consideration
of international capital market developments, in an effort
to ensure that the combined impact of changes to the real
interest rate and real exchange rate leads to an optimal de-
gree of monetary tightening or easing. However, the cen-
tral bank does not have the ability to fine-tune nominal ex-
change rate changes, thus the exchange rate path in con-
sistence with the disinflation path will be the product of a
continuing series of undershooting and overshooting epi-
sodes.
Time horizon of the central bank’s policy
The central bank’s interest rate moves, transmitted via vari-
ous channels, affect inflation over a longer period of time.
In fact, the Bank estimates the time in which the full impact
of a rate raise or cut feeds through to be at least 1.5 years. If
inflation deviates from the targeted path due to unforeseen
events over a shorter horizon, the central bank is con-
fronted with the following dilemma. If it views its function
in a narrow sense in terms of maintaining the inflation path
even over the short-term horizon, then it will have to re-
spond promptly and change policy before previous mea-
sures have had their full impact. This kind of monetary pol-
icy could lead to excessive volatility in output, causing
losses to society. Therefore, the National Bank’s goal is to
meet the inflation target at a minimum cost in terms of out-
put volatility, by confining policy responses solely to di-
vergence over a longer horizon of 1 to 1.5 years.
In order to provide the public with a clear under-
standing of the operation of the central bank’s policies, in
the future the National Bank will publish the projections
and considerations underlying the decisions taken by the
Monetary Council. Inflation projections will always cover
the forthcoming six quarters. In making decisions, the
Monetary Council will focus on price developments ex-
pected to occur 1–1.5 years later, as inflation over the next
two quarters is governed by events that have already taken
place. Due to the fact that inflation is determined by factors
which work in complex and unpredictable ways and show
a degree of volatility across time, the National Bank will
have to decide on a case-by-case basis which factors were
relevant and influential in a given period. However, since
flexibility should not infringe upon transparency, the Bank
also intends to publish the considerations behind mone-
tary policy decisions as well as to analyse the achievement
of the inflation target.
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2 Forecasting methodology
National Bank projections are always created using a com-
bination of methods, which are compared to produce the
central projection. In terms of methodology, the approach
is pluralistic, relying equally on specialist information, in-
ferences derived from theoretical models and statistical
forecasting techniques. Some of the methods start from the
very bottom, using disaggregated – company, sectoral,
product level, etc. – information, while others seek to cap-
ture the behaviour of larger aggregates. The central projec-
tion is based on the assumption of constant monetary vari-
ables (the nominal exchange rate and the interest rate).
The resulting projection thus forecasts key macroeco-
nomic variables over the next six quarters, assuming that
the current monetary and external conditions remain con-
stant.
The uncertainty in the projections stems from two
sources: (1) how correctly the economic mechanism bear-
ing on the reviewed phenomenon have been captured;
and (2) the actual outcome with regard to exogenous fac-
tors may diverge from the assumptions. For this reason, an
uncertainty interval has been designated around the cen-
tral projection.
Our risk assessment is represented graphically in
the form of a fan-chart, adopting the practice of inflation
targeting countries. The bands marked by different
colours/shades in the chart represent a given probability of
a particular interval of inflation outcome. There is a 50%
likelihood that inflation will be higher or lower than the
central projection (so it is the median value). This is com-
pared with the inflation target range to determine the likeli-
hood that the actual inflation is above or below the target
band. It should be noted that although towards the end of
the forecast horizon the fan-chart covers a wider and wider
area, this does not imply that the actual inflation outcome
will have that probability. The reason, in fact, is that as time
progresses, unforeseeable events, diverging from the fore-
cast, and monetary policy actions aimed at altering the in-
flation path could change both the central path and the
probability distribution. Therefore, the inflation projection
should be viewed as a conditional forecast, reflecting the
current knowledge of the National Bank.
Theoretical assumptions underlying
the inflation forecast
Changes in the nominal exchange rate have a direct impact
on tradable goods prices. The size of this effect is one of the
key variables in inflation forecasting as a whole (see Spe-
cial Topics, Section 3). Since market services are not traded
on international markets, their prices are primarily gov-
erned by domestic conditions, in contrast to tradable
goods. In the long run, the productivity difference be-
tween these two sectors, domestic demand and changes in
the terms of trade are the factors affecting market services
price inflation. Over the short term, inflation in market ser-
vices can diverge from the long-term path, as a result of
changes in processed food prices and the slow adjustment
of market participants (i.e. price rigidities). Prices of un-
processed foodstuffs are projected mostly using specialist
information, also taking account of information extracted
from futures prices. The projection for processed food
prices is derived from unprocessed food prices, wages (as
a demand variable) and the nominal exchange rate. The
forecast of regulated energy and services prices are pre-
pared on the basis of the Budget Act and pre-announced
regulated energy price changes. Inflation with regard to
market-priced energy moves in line with that of tradable
goods and energy prices. The projection for vehicle fuel
prices (petrol) is derived from world market prices for
petrol and the nominal exchange rate, taking account of
planned excise duty changes.
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3 Inflationary effect
of exchange rate changes
In a small, open economy, the rate of exchange is crucial to
the domestic price level. Since Hungarian import transac-
tions are almost exclusively denominated in foreign cur-
rency, the forint’s exchange rate transmits foreign prices to
domestic market participants. Under the former nar-
row-band crawling peg regime, tradable goods prices
were seen to almost exactly follow the pre-announced rate
of devaluation. Hence, the value of the exchange-rate
pass-through was in effect 100%.
It is highly likely that the widening of the exchange
rate band will have some impact on the exchange rate
pass-through as well. The predictability of the forint ex-
change rate has declined considerably, which may even
lead to large volatility in the domestic foreign-exchange
market. In fact, this already occurred in the early part of
July 2001. Both the National Bank’s own research and in-
ternational findings suggest that exchange rate volatility is
in negative correlation with the size of the pass-through.
There is a plausible reason for this. Consumer prices are
generally fixed for longer periods of time and are not
changed every time the exchange rate moves, because of
high costs arising from a number of factors.
The degree of the exchange rate pass-through de-
pends to a great extent on market participants’ perception
that the change in the exchange rate is temporary or per-
manent. If the exchange rate exhibits considerable volatil-
ity, reflecting uncertainty surrounding market participants’
expectations, they are much less likely to allow the change
to pass through into prices. From this it follows that no nu-
merical estimates of the pass-through can be derived from
historical Hungarian data. This is all the more difficult as in
the aftermath of the band-widening there was an unprece-
dented strengthening of the forint. It cannot be ruled out
that a depreciation or appreciation of the same extent will
have different impact on the rate of inflation, as certain
prices may be inelastic downwards.
Accordingly, the Bank has used the experience of
other European small open countries to draw conclusions
on the expected impact of an exchange rate change on
Hungarian tradable goods prices. Five countries, similar to
Hungary in respect of size and openness, have been ana-
lysed. These countries have operated floating or broad-
band exchange rate regimes for several years, and experi-
enced appreciation during this period. Naturally, sample
periods have been chosen to ensure that the monetary re-
gimes pursued during the reviewed period are homoge-
nous if possible: for the Czech Republic and Greece, the
periods start at mid-1996 and March 1998, respectively,
and for Ireland and Portugal the periods end in December
1998. In respect of Sweden, the analysis focuses on the past
seven years.
In the long run the estimated model meets the equali-
sation requirement of tradable goods prices with a small
difference, potentially triggered by a trend divergence of
wages. The latter effect stood at 0.3% in Hungary annually,
i.e. in the long run, tradable goods consumer prices rise by
this annual rate relative to Germany, measured in common
currency.
By contrast, over the shorter term, exchange rate
changes appear to make a smaller impact. In numerical
terms, the Czech Republic and Greece experienced the
strongest pass-through of the five countries: in respect of
both countries, a permanent change in the exchange rate
led to a nearly 50% and 75% pass-through after one year
and two years, respectively. The other three countries pro-
duced lower numbers, with the pass-through only at 40%
even after two years.
The National Bank uses the average of the Czech and
Greek figures to estimate the exchange rate pass-through
in Hungary, as Hungarian monetary policy will most prob-
ably exhibit the closest resemblance to these two coun-
tries. At the same time, the National Bank is aware that the
risks surrounding the Hungarian outcome are equally
weighted to the upside and the downside. Uncertainty is
made all the greater as the properties of the individual
goods and the market structure can also influence the nu-
merical value of the pass-through. For instance, the pass-
through may be faster in respect of mass-produced trad-
able goods, while exchange rate pass-through associated
with specific brand-name products may be smaller. The
business cycle and the demand/supply ratio may also in-
fluence the magnitude of pass-through. For example, if
supply is strong and competition is active in the market – a
typical situation with regard to tradables – but demand is
low, then the pass-through of an episode of depreciation
will be lower than that of appreciation. By contrast, during
an economic recovery and strong demand a possible de-
preciation will pass through to prices to a greater extent
than an appreciation. These effects have been taken into
account in estimating the uncertainty interval.
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